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The Impact and Limits of the
Constitutional Deregulation of
Health Claims on Foods and
Supplements: From Dementia to
Nuts to Chocolate to Saw Palmetto
by Margaret Gilhooley*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") recently issued an
enforcement policy identifying the types of health claims in the
disclaimers that are constitutionally permitted on foods and dietary
supplements. 1 In 1990 Congress required that before a company could
make a health claim on a food product, the FDA must approve the claim
as based on significant scientific agreement.2 While the 1990 law gave
the FDA discretion to establish a lesser standard for nutritional
supplements than for food products, the FDA chose to apply the same
standard. Thus, claims on nutritional supplements had to be supported

* Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. Fordham University (B.S. Ed., 1963);
Columbia University (J.D., 1966). Copyright, Margaret Gilhooley, 2004. An earlier version
of this Article was presented at the Association of American Law Schools, Section on
Agriculture Law, Panel on Food, Agriculture and the First Amendment on January 4, 2004.
1. Guidance for Industry and FDA: Interim Evidence-Based Ranking System for
Scientific Data (July 10, 2003), at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/hclmgui4.html
[hereinafter Guidance on Ranking System]; Guidance for Industry and FDA: Interim
Procedures for Qualified Health Claims in the Labeling of Conventional Human Food and
Human Dietary Supplements (July 10, 2003), at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/hclmgui3
.html [hereinafter Guidance on InterimProcedures]. See Notice of Availability of Guidance,
68 Fed. Reg. 41,387 (July 11, 2003).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i) (2000) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (2000).
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by significant scientific agreement. 4 Supplement marketers successfully
challenged this requirement in Pearson v. Shalala.5 In Pearson the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held, based
on the First Amendment, that the government could not suppress claims
that lacked significant scientific agreement when disclosures were
sufficient to prevent consumer confusion.' The court suggested that the
FDA consider the use of disclaimers, such as a warning that the claim
was inconclusive, but left the exact language of the disclaimers to the
FDA.7 Moreover, the court suggested that product claims made
contrary to the weight of the evidence might be barred when the
potential for deception could not be cured by disclaimers. s A district
court later found that claims with disclaimers may not be barred if there
is credible evidence for them.? The FDA has now identified the types
°
of claims and disclaimers it will accept for foods and supplements."
The FDA's enforcement policy for health claims warrants analysis not
only for its adequacy in protecting consumers, but also as an example of
constitutional deregulation. The application of commercial speech
principles to food and drug law is one of the most important recent
developments in the field, and the implications are still emerging.
The FDA's enforcement policy details the claims that can be2
"qualified"" by a disclaimer in categories that range from B to D.1

4. FDA Final Rule, Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements, 59 Fed.
Reg. 395, 405, 422-23 (Jan. 4, 1994).
5. 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
6. Id. at 650. See Margaret Gilhooley, ConstitutionalizingFood and Drug Law, 74
TUL. L. REV. 815, 844-62 (2000) [hereinafter Constitutionalizing];Paul Carrington, Our
Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1167, 1188-92 (2001).
7. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 658-59.
8. Id. at 661.
9. See infra Part II.B.2.
10. FDA/Center for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, Summary of Qualified Health
ClaimsPermitted (Sept. 2003), at httpJ/www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/qhc-sum.html [hereinafter
Summary]. The FDA issued the guidance as an enforcement policy because the FDA plans
further research on consumer understanding of the claims before the FDA adopts rules.
See FDA, Food Labeling; Health Claims; Dietary Guidance; Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,040 (Nov. 25, 2003) (requesting comments on various
approaches to replace the interim guidance). The issuance of the policy has been
challenged. See infra Part III.
11. A note about terminology is in order. The FDA describes the claims allowed as
'qualified claims" in the sense that they are qualified with disclaimers. The terminology
is counterintuitive, though, because the fully-supported "A" claim ends up being an
"unqualified claim" and the claims with incomplete support are referred to as qualified
claims. Instead of using the "qualified" terminology, this Article refers to claims as
disclaimers.
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Some may be puzzled by the lack of an A or F grade. The A category is
for claims that have significant scientific agreement, like the claim for
oat fiber in Cheerios. Such A category claims do not need to be qualified
by a disclaimer. The F category would be for claims that are so weak
that they are precluded. 3 To make its determinations, the FDA uses
an "evidence-based rating system" for evaluating scientific evidence, a
system adapted from the American Dietetic Association 4 to assign
claims into their respective rankings.
This Article focuses on the following claims, which are supported by
various levels of scientific evidence:
*Manufacturers of nutritional supplements containing phosphatidylserine15 can make a D-type claim that "very limited and
preliminary scientific research suggests" that the supplement may
reduce the risk of cognitive dysfunction or dementia in the elderly. 6 The supplement must also contain language that the "FDA
concludes that there is little scientific evidence to support this
claim. "17

- Manufacturers of antioxidant vitamins can make a C-type
claim that "some scientific evidence suggests" that consumption of
antioxidant vitamins may reduce the risks of certain forms of
cancer, but the "FDA has determined that this evidence is limited
and not conclusive."18
e Companies that sell walnuts can make a claim that "[s]upportive
but not conclusive research shows that eating 1.5 ounces per day" in

12. See Guidance on Ranking System, supra note 1; Guidance on Interim Procedures,
supra note 1, at 2; FDA News, FDA to EncourageScience-Based Labeling and Competition
for HealthierDietary Choices (July 10, 2003), at www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEWO0923.html [hereinafter FDA Labeling].
13. See Guidance on Ranking System, supra note 1, at 8; FDA Labeling,supra note 12.
14. Guidanceon Ranking System, supra note 1, at 3. The rank is determined by taking

into account the "quantity, consistency, and relevance to disease risk reduction of the
aggregate of the studies." Id. at 5.
15.

Phosphatidylserine is not a familiar substance. See infra Part V for the definition

of nutritional supplements and safety standards for supplements.
16. Summary, supra note 10, at 7 (citing Docket No. 02P-0413, 02/24/2003 enforcement
discretion letter, at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/ds-Itr33.html; 05/31/2003 letter, at
http://www.02/24/2003cfsan.fda.gov/dms/ds-Itr36.html [hereinafter Phosphatidylserine]).
17.

Id.

18. Id. at 2 (citing Docket No. 91N-0101, 04/01/2003 enforcement discretion letter, at
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/ds-Itr34.html).
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a low fat diet and "not resulting in increased caloric intake" may
reduce the risk of heart disease.19
This Article explores some important points about these claims. First,
the claims on the label do not bear the actual letter category or grade
identified in the guidance and press release.2" Second, the D claim is
strikingly weak and clearly raises the issue about what test is appropriate for precluding claims. Third, the disclosures for all the claims need
improvement. Lastly, in the case of nuts, the FDA, for the first time, is
allowing a claim for a food as opposed to a nutritional supplement. The
greater impact on the public from health claims on foods warrants
special attention.
The FDA recently prevailed in limiting the scope of the constitutional
deregulation of health claims for treatment of disease for the supplement
saw palmetto. 2
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the
agency's statutory interpretation that health claims include disease
prevention claims, but not disease treatment claims and determined that
such a limit does not violate commercial speech.22 In light of that
decision, this Article considers the constitutional permissibility of
allowing disease-prevention health claims for only those supplements
that are "nutritional," a limitation found in the statute.2" If such a
limit were recognized, non-nutritional supplements, such as St. John's
Wort, could make structure and function claims, as Congress has
allowed, but not disease-related health claims without meeting the drug
approval requirements.24 Exploring this issue will require consideration of the complex regulatory scheme for dietary supplement claims.25
This Article also examines the need for reform to ensure that the nonnutritional supplements are safe, as well as the relevance of the FDA's
guidance on the support for qualified health claims to the support
needed for the structure and function claims statutorily allowed for
dietary supplements. Currently, these supplements can include only

19. Id. at 3. The FDA Guidance provides for a similar disclaimer for B-type claims.
Guidance on Procedures,supra note 1. For nuts generally, though, the FDA recognized a
statement that was arguably more stringent that "scientific evidence suggests but does not
prove" that eating nuts may reduce the risk of heart disease. Id.
20. See supra note 12.
21. Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947 (2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 310 (2004)
[hereinafter "Second Whitaker"].
22. Id. at 950-53.
23. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (allowing health claims for supplements that are "vitamins,
minerals, herbs, or other similar nutritional substances").
24. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(A), (C) (2000).
25. See infra Parts I.C., V.B.
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structure and function claims.2" This Article considers the complexity
of the different approaches to health claims and, structure and function
claims for supplements and notes points where reform is most needed.
This Article primarily focuses on the FDA's new guidelines for the
types of qualified claims it will accept. This Article also examines the
restraints placed on the FDA by the constitutional grounds that underlie
the new policy. Part II provides background on the legislation governing
the use of health claims and on the judicial decisions recognizing
constitutional protections for claims with disclaimers and rejecting
efforts to preclude claims. Part III assesses the FDA's new enforcement
policy for claims on supplements with respect to the test for barring
claims and the framework for providing better disclaimers. Part IV
separately examines the enforcement policy for foods and the existence
of specific legislative standards for the claims on foods. Part V examines
the judicial decision finding that it is statutorily and constitutionally
permissible to prevent supplements from containing disease treatment
health claims and to require the products with such claims to meet the
drug approval requirements. Part VI concludes by reflecting on the
types of reforms that are most needed in the regulation of supplements
and the importance of Congress's role, notwithstanding the constitutional deregulation that has occurred.

II.

BACKGROUND ON STATUTE, LITIGATION, AND EVOLUTION OF

FDA

POLICY

Statutory and Regulatory Provisionsfor Health Claims
At one point the FDA did not allow companies to display any explicit
health claims on foods because it viewed them as drug claims.27
Manufacturers that made a drug claim bore the burden of supporting the
claim with "adequate and well-controlled investigations" and obtaining
agency approval before sell of the drug.28 Meeting the strict standards
for drug approval is often not feasible for the manufacturers of food
products.

A.

26. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (allowing health claims for supplements that are "vitamins,
minerals, herbs, or other similar nutritional substances").
27. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Margaret Gilhooley, Herbal
Remedies and Dietary Supplements, 49 FLA. L. REV. 663, 676 & 678 nn.78-79 (1997)
[hereinafter Herbal Remedies].
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)-(e) (2004).
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Foods, as commodities, are more difficult to protect under patent or
intellectual property rights, which support extensive research.29
Additionally, health claims often relate to disease prevention, and these
effects may need difficult and expensive long-term population studies to
be fully adequate."0
The FDA began to reconsider its approach in the 1980s when the
National Cancer Institute discovered that fiber could reduce the risk of
cancer. 1 The FDA proposed rules that would have allowed nonmisleading health claims on foods when supported by the weight of the
evidence.3 2 However, food manufacturers abused the proposed rules by
advertising health claims about foods with nutritional drawbacks, such
as an advertisement about the value of vitamin A in butter.3 3
In response to these concerns, in 1990 Congress enacted a law that
allowed health claims for foods, but only if the FDA determined that
"based on the totality of publicly available scientific evidence ... there
is significant scientific agreement, among experts ... that the claim is
supported by such evidence."34 The significant scientific agreement
standard is viewed as a proxy for the type of support that experts believe
is needed in a field where long-term testing is not always feasible.35
While the statute authorized health claims on foods only if supported by
substantial scientific agreement, the law left it to the FDA to decide
what procedures and standards should apply to "nutritional" supplements. 6 The FDA, by regulation, applied the same standards to
supplements as it applied to foods.3 7

29. See Constitutionalizing,supra note 6, at 855, n.211.
30. See Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Commission on Dietary
Supplement Labels, Report of the Commission on Dietary Supplement Labels (Nov. 24,
1997), at http://www.health.gov/dietsupp [hereinafter Commission Report]; Margaret
Gilhooley, Deregulationand the Administrative Role: Looking at Dietary Supplements, 62
MONT. L. REV. 85, 111-13 & n.128 (Winter 2001) [hereinafter Deregulation].
31. HerbalRemedies, supra note 27, at 678 nn.78-79.
32. Food Labeling:Public Health Messages on FoodLabels and Labeling, 52 Fed. Reg.
28,843 (Aug. 4, 1987).
33. See Hearingson Disease Prevention Claimsfor FoodLabeling Before a Subcomm.
of House Comm. on Gov't Operations,101st Cong., 1st Sess. p. 10, at 14 (1989) (testimony
of Bruce Silverglade). See Part IV for restrictions on claims for foods that present nutrient
detriments, a provision that impacts claims for butter.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
35. Deregulation, supra note 30, at 111 n.128 (citing Committee on Diet and Health,
National Research Council, Diet and Health: Implications for Reducing Chronic Disease
Risk 5 (1989)); Commission Report, supra note 30.
36. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (2000).
37. See Constitutionalizing,supra note 6, at 845.
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Litigation
1. Pearson v.Shalala

In Pearson v. Shalala,3" a marketer of supplements sought to make
health claims that antioxidant vitamins may reduce the risk of cancer.
The FDA refused to allow the marketer to do so because of the lack of
significant scientific agreement for the claim. The research revealed
such an effect for fruits and vegetables containing these vitamins but not
for the vitamins themselves. The FDA believed the vitamin might only
be a marker for other constituents in the food that produced the claimed
effect.39 The FDA also rejected the alternative of allowing the claim
with a disclaimer that the "FDA has determined that the evidence
supporting the claim is inconclusive."4 °
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the FDA's refusal to
consider the use of any disclaimer was inconsistent with the final prong
of the Central Hudson4 test for commercial speech. The Central
Hudson test required that there be a "reasonable fit" between the means
and ends, and recognized disclaimers as constitutionally preferable to
outright suppression.4 2 The court suggested that a disclaimer could be
drafted for the antioxidant vitamins that met the FDA's concerns about
the marker theory.43

38. 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
39. Id. at 653-54. The court found that the claim the marketers sought to make that
lacked significant scientific agreement was not precluded by the threshold Central Hudson
test because it was not "inherently misleading." Id. at 657; Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). While the Government had a substantial
public interest in protecting the public health, the safety of the supplements was not at
issue. Furthermore, any effect on health in crowding out better food choices was too
indirect and insufficient to meet the other prongs of the CentralHudson test. Although the
government had a substantial interest in precluding misleading claims, the Government
failed to show a "reasonable fit" that would have justified a ban in view of the availability
of disclaimers to prevent consumer confusion. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 655-58.
40. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 653. The litigation also involved claims for Omega-3 fatty
acids and coronary heart disease, and fiber and colorectal cancer. These claims also
involved the marker theory presented by the claim for antioxidants. A claim for folic acid
and birth defects, based on disclaimers, was also sought, which involved a dispute about
the supporting evidence. Id. at 653-54, 658-59. This Article focuses only on the antioxidant
claim as illustrative of the issues.
41. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
42. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 656-57. In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, the
Supreme Court restated the preference for disclosure over suppression in the case of drugs.
535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002).
43. The court thought the weakness in the antioxidant claim "could be accommodated"
by a disclaimer along the lines that "[tihe evidence is inconclusive because existing studies

690

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

The court, however, left the task of drafting precise disclaimers to the
agency.44 The court offered guidance for potentially precluding
claims,4 5 but that guidance has proved contentious. The court of
appeals suggested that "where evidence in support of a claim is
outweighed by evidence against the claim, the FDA could deem it
incurable by a disclaimer and ban it outright."46 Finally, the court
gave a hypothetical that portends the claim for dementia now found in
the FDA's enforcement policy:
For example, if the weight of the evidence were against the hypothetical claim that "Consumption of Vitamin E reduces the risk of Alzheimer's disease," the agency might reasonably determine that adding a
disclaimer such as "The FDA has determined that no evidence supports
this claim" would not suffice to mitigate the claim's misleadingness 7
2. Whitaker v. Thompson
The FDA's action on remand illustrates the limited choices that
remain with the FDA and the restraints imposed by commercial speech
protections. The FDA initially rejected the use of disclaimers for claims
on supplements, including the antioxidant vitamins, even though the
court of appeals had suggested disclaimers that might be used for these
vitamins.48 Instead, the FDA found that the antioxidants fell within
the category of claims that were against the weight of the evidence, the
area that the court of appeals had left open for the possibility that a
misleading claim could not be cured by a disclaimer.4 9
As one might expect, the FDA's refusal to allow the claim brought the
FDA back to court. In Whitaker v.Thompson,"0 the district court found
that the FDA failed to follow its own standards in determining that the
claim was not supported by the available evidence." Even if this was

have been performed with foods containing antioxidant vitamins, and the effect of those
foods on reducing the risk of cancer may result from other components in those foods."
Pearson, 164 F.3d at 658.
44. Id. at 659.
45. Id. at 659-60.
46. Id. According to the court in Pearson, the FDA could also ban a claim if the
evidence in support of it was qualitatively weaker, as when it rested on one or two old
studies. Id. at 658 n.10.
47. Id. at 659.
48. See supra text accompanying note 38.
49. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 655.
50. 248 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2002) [hereinafter "First Whitaker"].
51. Id. at 13-14. In Pearson the district court also adopted a similar test. 164 F. 3d at
650.
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not the case, the FDA acted in violation of both the First Amendment52
and the Pearsondecision by suppressing the claim rather than proposing
a disclaimer to the effect that the evidence was inconclusive.53
The district court not only rejected the FDA's refusal to allow the
antioxidant claims relating to cancer, it also narrowed-some might say
unduly-the Pearson test for when claims can be precluded. As the
district court read it, the court of appeals "implied, though did not
declare explicitly, that when 'credible evidence' supports a claim, that
claim may not be absolutely prohibited." 4 A claim can be precluded
only in "narrow circumstances" when there is "almost no qualitative
evidence" in support of the claim and the government has empirical
evidence to prove that the public would be deceived even if there were
a disclaimer.55 The FDA argued that Pearson can be read as saying
that claims could be precluded if they were against the weight of the
evidence." The district court's test was demanding and fixed while the
court of appeals decision seemed more tentative and Delphic in
identifying the criteria for an emerging area of claims. The FDA did
not, however, appeal the Whitaker decision.

52. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53. First Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 10. The First Whitaker case seemed to narrow Pearsonin other ways. While
the disclaimer used by the court of appeals for its Alzheimer hypothetical referred to the

absence of evidence, the aim of Pearson did not seem to have the weight of the evidence
test apply only in situations when there is no contrary evidence, as the court in the First
Whitaker case discovered. Rather, the aim of Pearson might have been to suggest that
even a disclaimer stating the deficiency in the strongest terms-that there was no
evidence, not merely weak evidence-could be found insufficient. The court in the First
Whitaker case also adopted as a broad principle the court of appeals statement about the
need for empirical evidence to rule out the use of disclaimers "similar to the ones [the
Court] suggested above," but that reference seems to have been to the disclaimer about the
marker theory, not necessarily some general standard for all disclaimers. First Whitaker,
248 F. Supp. 2d at 10. Moreover, the Pearson court's disclaimer for the Alzheimer claim
in the hypothetical it gave seemed to rely on a judgmental determination, rather than one
that required empirical evidence. The district court also seemed unduly restrictive in
reading Pearson'sreference to the possibility that claims can be precluded on a qualitative
basis, with an example of claims that rest "on only one or two old studies," as establishing
that the age and number of the studies is the sole or primary test for determining when
studies are deficient. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 659 n.10. Pearson also recognized that there
may be more leeway for precluding claims in dealing with consumer confusion "where the
product affects health," but the government must meet its burden by more than conclusory
assertions. Id. at 659.
57. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 650.
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C. FDA's Revised Enforcement Policy for Health Claims and
Challenges
After Whitaker the FDA recognized that the court in Whitaker, in
"interpreting Pearson,found that 'credible evidence,' rather than 'weight
of the evidence' was the appropriate standard for the FDA to apply in
evaluating qualified health claims.""8 Accordingly, the FDA "tempered"
its earlier approach using the weight of the evidence standard by taking
account of the credible evidence test.5 9
That tempered test underlies the new FDA policy. The change also
reflects the Bush administration's response to the litigation setbacks
that the tough Clinton-era policies encountered. In CSPI v.FDA,6 °
filed in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the Center for Science in the
Public Interest ("CSPI") and Public Citizen challenged the FDA's new
policy that allowed foods to carry claims with disclaimers, its use of the
credible evidence test, and its failure to use rulemaking.6 1 The district
court dismissed the case on ripeness and standing grounds.62 The aim
in this Article is not to assess the specific issues in the lawsuit, but to
reexamine the adequacy of the overall test for qualified claims in light
of the range of claims for actual products now permitted.
D. Statutory Deregulationof Structure and Function Claims for
Dietary Supplements
Before turning to the analysis of the qualified health claims, some
additional background is needed on the other types of claims permitted
In 1994 Congress enacted the Dietary
on dietary supplements.

58. 68 Fed. Reg. 41,387, 41,388 (July 11, 2003).
59. Id. at 41,388-89.
60. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, CSPI v. FDA, No. 03-1962 (D.D.C.
Sept. 23, 2003).
61. Id. at 7-8, 10. CSPI disagreed with the FDA policies of allowing qualified claims
for foods based on the credible evidence test, failing to use rulemaking, and not complying
with other statutory requirements. CSPI maintained that the FDA can preclude a claim
even if some credible evidence supports it, if the weight of credible evidence does not. Id.
at 10. The complaint favored the continued use of the significant scientific agreement test.
Id. at 7. It did not focus on the disclaimers that should be used.
62. CSPI v. FDA, No. 03-1962 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2004) (mem.). Plaintiff moved to alter
the court's order on the basis that the agency had approved a qualified claim for walnuts
in a way that makes the case ripe for review, but the court denied the motion. CSPI v.
FDA, No. 03-1962 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2004). See Summary, supra note 10, at 3, 5; FDA/Center for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, Qualified Health Claims Letter of Enforcement
Discretion-Walnutsand CoronaryHeart Disease (Mar. 9, 2004), at http://www.cfsan.fda.
gov/-dms/qhcnuts3.html [hereinafter QualifiedHealth Claimsfor Walnuts]; infra note 113.
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Supplement Health and Education Act ("DSHEA"), which allowed
dietary supplements to have structure and function claims and a
disclaimer that the supplement had not been approved by the FDA nor
was it intended to prevent or treat disease.63 Structure and function
claims are used for products that fall within the definition of drugs and
would require drug testing and agency approval but for the exemption.' The FDA issued rules undertaking the difficult task of distinguishing the structure and function claims from disease claims. 5 The
DSHEA also recognized substances as dietary supplements even though
they were not food ingredients or nutrients in the ordinary sense.6" As
a result, structure and function claims are now widespread in supplements, as evidenced by claims made concerning St. John's Wort. Some
of the differences between health claims and structure and function
claims are discussed later. 7
Other Commercial Speech Cases
In addition to Pearson,two other cases in the late 1990s dealt with the
application of commercial speech principles to claims about foods and
drugs. The D.C. District Court found that drug manufacturers are
constitutionally protected in distributing reprints of medical articles to
doctors about unapproved uses for drugs when accompanied by
disclaimers.68 However, the litigation testing the issue ended inconclusively on appeal.69 In 2002 the United States Supreme Court, in
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,7" invalidated a legislative
restriction affecting disease treatment and prevention claims for drugs
compounded by pharmacies.71 The decision in Western States prompted

E.

63. Herbal Remedies, supra note 27, at 665-66.
64. FDA Final Rule, Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements
Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure and Function of the Body, 65 Fed.
Reg. 1000 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
65. Id.
66. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(A) (2000) (allowing supplement makers to make claims
about the role of a "dietary" ingredient as well as a "nutrient"). Earlier, a court found a
substance to be a food only if it was consumed for taste, aroma, or nutritive value.
Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1983). See HerbalRemedies, supra note
27, at 684-85.
67. See Parts V and VI.
68. Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated,
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
69. Id.; Constitututionalizing,supra note 6.
70. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
71. Id. See Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Constitution after Western
States, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 901 (2003) (hereinafter DrugRegulation]. The make-up of the
dissenters was unusual because they included Chief Justice Rehnquist but not Justice

694

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

the FDA to seek public comment on the implications of the FDA's other
regulatory programs.72 The full reach of the commercial speech
protections remains to be fully tested on the FDA's regulation of foods,
drugs, and supplements, but the impact is significant. The ongoing
disputes about the use of disclaimers for health claims reflects this
fundamental change. The most recent case, Whitaker v. Thompson,7 3
limiting the use of disease treatment claims with disclosures, will be
discussed later.
III.

HEALTH CLAIMS WITH DISCLAIMERS FOR SUPPLEMENTS

The assessment of the developments for health claims with disclaimers
starts with the enforcement policy's approach to the claims for supplements. While the FDA has authority under the statute to determine the
standard for health claims for supplements, the agency adopted the
same standard for supplement claims as the one that governs health
claims for foods under the statute. 4 The analysis of the FDA's
enforcement policy begins with the claims having the least support, as
exemplified by the dementia claim for phosphatidylserine, continues with
the claim that has more support for antioxident/cancer prevention, and
then examines the qualified claim with the strongest support, that for
nuts and the risk of heart diease. The discussion concludes with the
relevance of nutrient detriments as a limitation on health claims for
foods like chocolate.
A.

Claim for Dementia/PhosphatidylserineSupplements
1. FDA Analysis of Support

The D claim that the FDA allowed for various treatments for dementia
illustrates how little is needed to meet the First Whitaker's credible
evidence test. Indeed, in assessing a claim like this, one has to ask what

Souter. Id. at 911-12.
72. Request for Comment on First Amendment Issue, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942, 34,943 (May
16, 2002); DrugRegulation, supra note 71; Margaret Gilhooley, The Supreme Court Checks
Out Drug Promotion Restrictions, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 347 (2003).
73. Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947 (2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 310 (2004)
[hereinafter "Second Whitaker"].
74. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (2000); supra notes 23, 26. See Constitutionalizing,supra
note 6, at 857 (suggesting that review of the agency's regulatory authority to establish the
standards for health claims on supplements could have provided an alternative nonconstitutional grounds for the result).
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a D or F claim means. The FDA's Final Decision Letter75 for the claim
concerning a substance's effect on dementia stated that there is
"considerable uncertainty" whether data on the mitigation of symptoms
applies to prevention. 76 Under the FDA's criteria, a D claim is one for
which there is "an extremely low level of comfort among 7qualified
scientists that the claimed relationship is scientifically valid."
The difficulty with this claim, however, even went beyond the
inferences to be made from these preliminary findings. The difficulty
was that the weakness extended to the studies that were to determine
whether there was any effect on the symptoms. The FDA commented
that the studies "all were seriously flawed or limited in their reliability."78 In the few cases in which "nominally statistically significant
relationships were reported," the relationships were to a few "selective"
functions and did not demonstrate an effect on the range of characteristics of dementia.7 9 Also, the results reported for the studies were only
based on those who completed the study, an approach that failed to take
into account the possible bias created by the large number of "dropouts."" The FDA decision found that generalizations from these
limited results were "fraught with considerable uncertainty."8 '
2. Assessing the Test for Precluding Claims: FDA Criteria and the
Credible Evidence Test
The weaknesses in the scientific support identified by the FDA
might justify precluding the claim as one that lacks credible evidence to
support it, even under the First Whitaker test adopted by the FDA. 2
The FDA recognizes that D claims can be precluded if there is "a strong
body of evidence against the claim (e.g., a study or studies of high
persuasiveness, quality, and relevance that do not detect an effect)."' 3
But that approach imposes a higher standard on the contrary testing
than on the studies purporting to show the effect, which are mostly
"moderate or low quality studies" that result in a "very low degree of

75. Phosphatidylserine,supra note 16.
76. Id.
77. Guidance on Ranking System, supra note 1, at 8; Guidance on Interim Procedures,
supra note 1, at 2.

78.
79.

Phosphatidylserine,supra note 16.
Id.

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
See First Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 10-11.

83. Guidance on Interim Proecdures,supra note 1, at 8.
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confidence that results could be extrapolated to the target population."84 Moreover, "studies of high persuasion" seem likely to take more
time to do than studies that result in a "very low degree of confidence,"
but claims with a very low level of support can continue to be made with
disclaimers unless better studies become available. In the meantime,
the "qualified" claim based on preliminary findings with weak support
can be made. This result reflects the consequences of the First
Whitaker's
allowance of claims with credible evidence with disclaim85
ers.
Moreover, the court in Pearson left open the possibility that the FDA
could ban a claim as "incurable by disclaimers" but only when the
"evidence in support of the claim is outweighed by the evidence against
the claim." 6 The point worth exploring here is not whether the
credible evidence adequately captures the uncertain scope of the court
of appeals test, but whether either test is adequate.8 7 The underlying
question is whether a health claim on a product is reliable enough to be
an essentially valid claim and whether disclaimers can fairly reflect the
weaknesses in sub-standard claims. 88
Barring claims only when there are affirmative studies to prove the
claim invalid provides insufficient consumer protection. The important
issues are whether the scientists' lack of confidence in the findings'
reliability in support of a claim should count as evidence that weighs
against the claim, and whether this lack of confidence should justify
precluding weak claims. When scientists have an extremely low level of
confidence in the reliability of the claim, as they do for the dementia
claim, it seems to be enough to warrant barring a claim that purports to
be valid. These claims are being made to lay people who are not in a
position to assess the scientific strengths or weaknesses of the asserted
claim.
Thus, when scientists find substantial weaknesses in the support for
a claim, this should count in showing that the claim is against the

84. Id.
85. See First Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 14.
86. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 659.
87. See Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, CSPI v. FDA, No. 03-19-1962
(D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2004) (determining that the FDA can preclude a claim, even if some
credible evidence supports it, if the weight of credible evidence does not).
88. See Herbal Remedies, supra note 27, at 715-21 (discussing whether claims for
unproven products should be permitted by Congress to allow consumers to have "freedom
of choice," and identifying the types of safeguards that would need to be explored). The
specific disclaimer suggested would have reflected the standards for approving drugs and
stated, "This product has neither been generally recognized as effective by experts, nor
approved by FDA based on adequate and well-controlled studies." Id. at 715.
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weight of the evidence and lacks credible evidence, even absent a
contrary scientific study demonstrating that the projected effect will not
occur. Such an approach may be thought to be inappropriate because it
would, in effect, put the burden on those making the claims to show that
scientists believe there is enough evidence to prove the claim. But
shifting the burden seems appropriate. The weak claims still suggest
that the product has an effect. Even with disclaimers, the labeling can
be contradictory in suggesting that consumers can infer an effect based
on studies that do not cross the threshold of support that scientists
expect. Moreover, there is a human cost created by a product claiming
to reduce the risk of important health-related effects like dementia
because it involves human effort and hopes to use it continuously with
no real prospect of benefit.
3. The Adequacy of Disclaimers

a. The General Difficulty. If health claims are to be allowed with
disclaimers, more attention must be given to the adequacy of the
disclaimer. An important problem with using disclaimers to prevent
deception is that the disclaimers chosen are often mild and do not make
clear the weakness of the claim. If the disclaimers are required to be
fully adequate, marketers may not want to make the claim. If the FDA
does not require fully adequate disclaimers, the courts may accept the
disclaimers as being within the FDA's reasonable discretion. Several
steps need to be taken to provide a better framework for disclaimers for
all types of claims to make clear the limits of scientific support the
claims have.
b. Framework for Disclaimers. The claim for dementia provides
that "very limited and preliminary research suggests" the effect and the
"FDA concludes that there is little scientific evidence to support" the
claim.89 To improve the disclaimer, the first thing the FDA should do
is require the maker of the claim to state its grade-for example, that
the dementia claim has "D-level support" or a "D grade." The FDA took
a useful step in ranking the claims in terms of grades. However, while
the FDA found the letter categories important in explaining the system
in its guidelines and used the letters as grades in its press release, it did
not require the grade to be placed on the label. If the informed reader
needs the grading system for assistance in a guidance document, the
average consumer needs the grading system even more when the claim
is on a label. The FDA has failed to follow the standard it recognized as

89. Phosphatidylserine,supra note 16.
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needed to make the policy understandable and has, thus, failed to
exercise its reasonable discretion. If the agency does not want to reduce
the ranking solely to a letter grade, it could use a textual explanation in
conjunction with the letter grade: for example, D/weak support; C/fair
to minimal support; B/good to moderate support.
Second, the disclaimer should indicate the qualitative drawbacks in
the support for the claim and not simply the limited quantity of support
or that the research is not conclusive. To do this the grade is important
as well as information on the scientific evaluation. For example, in the
case of a qualified D claim, the label should state that there is "an
extremely low level of comfort 9° [or confidence] among qualified scien-

tists that the claimed relationship is scientifically valid."9 1
Last, the information provided to consumers should provide them with
a means to learn more about the types of uncertainties and unanswered
questions that prevent scientists from recognizing the claim as scientifically established. If consumers will have to make the assessment for
themselves about the scientific reliability of the claims, they should have
access to the key information about the state of the available scientific
assessments, such as that reflected in the FDA Decision Letter.
To do this, a copy of the consumer labeling could be enclosed in the
package. The package could provide the FDA web address where
consumers could obtain a copy of the FDA letter. This alternative,
however, is less likely to be useful to consumers. Of course, if the FDA
were to have better disclaimers, then the marketers could challenge the
determinations. This might lead to more litigation, but it would protect
the public, and that aim has to be the key consideration.
The government also bears the burden of showing that disclaimers are
not sufficient before their use can be precluded.92 Indeed, the FDA is
asking for comments on the research needs and regulatory alternatives

90. Guidance on Interim Procedures,supra note 1, at 8. The FDA letter referred to the
level of comfort among scientists, terminology used by the National Academy of Sciences.
"Confidence" would seem to be clearer in its meaning than "comfort" and more appropriate
for a label.
91. Id. A disclosure is suggested below in PartlV about the lack of significant scientific
agreement for B claims on foods. Phrasing the disclaimer in these terms is especially
appropriate for foods because Congress used that test as the governing standard. For
supplements, the FDA has discretion about the standards, and stating the disclosure in
terms of the low level of scientific confidence is a helpful approach. Referring to the lack
of significant scientific agreement is also useful to reflect fully the state of scientific
opinion.
92. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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before adopting a rule.93 However, those seeking to make a claim that
lacks the testing needed to prevent deception should have the burden to
show that the disclaimers they plan to use will not deceive purchasers.
Thus, given this assessment, the current constitutional allocation of the
burden is questionable.
4. Constitutional Constraints
If the question was solely whether the FDA could reasonably find
that consumers would not be deceived by the new claims, one could
debate the finding and whether it was within the scope of the FDA's
discretion to which the courts should defer in reviewing administrative
decisions. While one might disagree, the decision would be within the
ordinary framework of accountability for FDA action. Here, though, the
FDA's decision is constrained by commercial speech protections. The
constitutional standards used by the courts tip the balance toward
allowing claims that the FDA might not reasonably allow. Moreover,
Congress lacks the ability to exercise its usual oversight role with
respect to FDA discretionary decisions or to toughen the standard.
Claim for Antioxidant/ CancerPrevention Supplements

B.

1. FDA Assessment and Test for Preclusion
Under its new policy, the FDA will allow a qualified claim that the
antioxidant vitamins C and E may prevent cancer. Under the FDA's
guidance for the C claims, the claims would be based "mostly on
moderate to low quality studies" with tests based on "insufficient
numbers of individuals."94 Under the FDA's criteria for these claims,
there is "a low level of comfort [or confidence] among qualified scientists"
for its validity.95 Indeed, claims with this level of scientific support
present a close question of whether they should be considered to be
against the weight of the evidence and suitably precluded. This
assessment also depends upon accepting that the weaknesses in the
supporting studies that scientists find important can be factors in
showing that the weight of the evidence is against the claim, even
absent a specific contrary scientific study demonstrating that the
projected effect will not occur.

93.
2003)
94.
95.

Food Labeling: Health Claims, Dietary Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,040 (Nov. 25,
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
Guidance on Interim Procedures, supra note 1, at 7-8.
Id.
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An assessment about the adequacy of the support for the claims for
the antioxidant vitamins C and E can be influenced by reactions to the
difficulties encountered with studies of another vitamin. The National
Cancer Institute sponsored a long-term controlled study to determine if
supplements containing vitamin A, another antioxidant vitamin, reduced
the risk of cancer on its own. For ethical reasons, the study was stopped
before completion when no preventative effect had been shown and
indications suggested that the supplement could cause harm in
smokers.9" This result could suggest to some that the theory that
antioxidants are mere markers has some validity and that more testing
is needed to establish claims with full confidence. 97
2. Adequacy of the Disclaimers
The potential for deception is related to the adequacy of the supplement's disclaimer and the level of support that the claim has. The
FDA!s disclaimers for C claims provide that "some scientific evidence
suggests" the effect, but the FDA has determined the evidence is "limited
and not conclusive."9 8
The adequacy of the agency's disclaimers can again be faulted for the
reasons suggested above, given the limited scientific evidence for the
claims. In any case, the disclaimers should indicate the C level grade
and that, under the FDA's criteria, there is "a low level of comfort [or
99
Either the
confidence] among qualified scientists for its validity."
FDA Decision Letter should be provided to consumers, or consumers
should be informed of the means to obtain the information.
IV.

HEALTH CLAIMS WITH DISCLAIMERS FOR FOODS: THE CLAIM FOR
NuTs AND THE SPECTER OF CHOCOLATE

The claim for nuts recognized in the FDA's enforcement policy is the
first example of a health claim with disclaimers for a food and the likely
predecessor of others to follow. The claim has "B" level support. This
may not be a mere coincidence because grocery manufacturers may be
unwilling, at least initially, to make weak claims for products sold to the

96. Gina Kolata, Studies Find Beta Carotene, Used by Millions, Doesn't Forestall
Cancer or HeartDisease, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1996, at A16. The increased risk to smokers
was not found to be statistically significant. Id.
97. Id. Dr. Klauser, the head of NCI, states that "[tihe major message.., is that no
matter how compelling and exciting a hypothesis is, we don't know whether it works
without clinical trials." Id.
98. Guidance on Ranking System, supra note 1, at 2.
99. Id.
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general public for their sustenance. Congress established specific
standards for health claims for foods and precluded claims for foods with
Thus, the appropriateness of the use of
nutrient detriments.'0 0
disclaimers for health claims on foods presents distinct issues.
A.

The Health Claim for Nuts
1. FDA Analysis of Support and Appropriateness of the Claim

The B category represents health claims with a moderate to good
level of support under the FDA's guidance. 10 ' Even the B claims have
their weaknesses because the FDA based this category on historical data
evaluated by the National Academy of Sciences "that indicated over time
that many diet/disease relationships that met this level of evidence were
not necessarily sustained."' 2
What is especially notable about the B claim recognized by the FDA
for nuts is that it relates to a food and not merely a supplement.
Congress allowed the FDA to establish the standards and procedures
governing supplements, but only allowed health claims for foods if the
claim was supported by significant scientific agreement. 0 3 The
constitutional challenges to date on health claims concerning supplements did not raise the same direct challenge to Congress's authority.'0 4 There are also differences between supplements and foods that
justify a higher standard for foods, including that supplement purchaswilling to devote more time to
ers seek out the claims and may be
0 5
assessing claims with weak support.
The prospect that Congress might receive some special deference in
legislating, with respect to products that affect the public health,
suffered a setback in the Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v.

100. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(A)(ii) (2000).
101. Guidance on Ranking System, supra note 1, at 7; Guidanceon Interim Procedures,
supra note 1, at 2.
102. Id.
103. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
104. The court in Pearson observed that the FDA applied the same "substantive
standard and procedure for the regulation of health claims on foods" to supplements "even
though the substantive standard and procedure for foods, unlike dietary supplements, was
prescribed by statute." Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 653 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
105. Also, food is a necessity, and the public generally assumes that they can rely on
the claims without having to assess fine-print qualifications in the supermarket aisle.
When the makers of foods with weak support can make claims, consumers may purchase
these products rather than ones that reliably provide a health benefit.
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Western States Medical Center."°6 The Court invalidated a statutory
prohibition on advertisements of unapproved drugs compounded by
pharmacists to meet individual needs when there were nonspeech
alternatives that Congress might have used to protect the public." 7
For the majority in Western States, the risks of consumer confusion could
be dealt with by disclaimers stating that "the drug
had not undergone
08
FDA testing and that its risks were unknown."
Still, the use of health claims for disclaimers on food is a harder case.
Unlike the prescription drugs involved in Western States, foods with
health claims are sold directly to consumers. Foods are also heavily
advertised, and the health claims with disclaimers may be made in
television ads.'0 9 Foods are also sold nationwide and impact a wider
public than pharmaceutical compounds made to meet individual medical
needs. Health claims on foods seem particularly questionable when they
have such a low acceptance among qualified scientists that they would
earn a C or D grade." °
The harder question relates to the B claims with their "moderate/good"
support, a classification that covers a wide middle range. Congress
specifically required foods to have significant scientific agreement for
claims."' Without that level of recognition for the supporting studies,
uncertainty remains about the claim. The congressional judgment
deserves respect on the support needed for claims about the value of
foods for disease prevention, but legislative standards have not been
considered sufficient by themselves to restrict commercial speech." 2
2. Disclaimers
Thus, the question of what type of disclaimer is needed when foods
make health claims that are not fully supported is important. The

106. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
107. Id. at 371-72.
108. Id. at 376.
109. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") regulates advertisements for foods. 15
U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
110. See Guidance on Ranking System, supra note 1 for the FDA evidence-based
ranking system and discussion of D Claims. The court in Pearson required the agency to
provide definite standards for the determination of significant scientific agreement.
Pearson, 164 F.3d at 650. The FDA ranking system seems adequate to identify the
standard for the determination.
111. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
112. See W. States, 535 U.S. at 371-72; Pearson, 164 F.3d at 653 n.2.
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disclaimers for foods should provide all the information indicated
above.'13
Under the FDA policy, B claims on foods such as nuts would ordinarily
have to state that "some scientific evidence suggests but does not prove"
the claimed effect, but the FDA has also accepted an alternative
statement for walnuts that "[s]upportive but not conclusive research
shows" that it may have a beneficial health effect." 4 The claim
indicates to consumers a key factor, that is, the absence of proof. The
difficulty, though, is that the disclaimer invites consumers to make an
inference about the likelihood of the effect and the value of more testing,
even though that inference is beyond their ability to judge. Indeed, even
scientists may have difficulty in being sure of the estimate when the
evidence is incomplete. A survey conducted by the National Academy of
Sciences found that many studies with a B level of support do not prove
valid when full testing is done." 5 What can be said is that a projection is uncertain and that the significance of uncertainty reflects not
only scientific factors but also a policy decision on how important it is to
The best assurance that a claim is
have highly reliable support.'
valid, even absent definitive testing, is that a threshold of studies exists
that leads to significant scientific agreement about the validity of the
claim.117 The public should have the benefit of knowing whether that
level of confidence exists among scientists before they make a personal
projection based on a disclaimer.
Thus, the disclaimer should be phrased to do this by stating that
"[flurther studies are needed before significant scientific agreement
exists for the claim." Stating the disclaimer in these terms also reflects
the statutory standard for health claims on foods, and Congress's
judgment deserves recognition with respect to what consumers need to
know to prevent confusion."'

113. The FTC should use its regulatory authority over advertisements to ensure that
food ads clearly state the lack of significant scientific agreement for the claim and its B
grade.
114. See Summary, supra note 10; QualifiedHealth Claimsfor Walnuts, supra note 62.
115. Guidance on Ranking System, supra note 1, at 7.
116. Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions:Regulating Carcinogenin EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO.

L.J. 729, 732-36, 740-45, 750 (1979) (analyzing the significance of uncertainties in
identifying the existence of a risk, an analysis that also seems relevant in considering the
adequacy of support for a claim).
117.

Guidance on Ranking System, supra note 1, at 7-8.

118. See W. States, 535 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding an affirmative
basis may need to exist for the legislative judgment).
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A better identification of what constitutes significant scientific
agreement was considered necessary in Pearson,however, before it could
be the basis of regulatory action. 1 9 The FDA has now identified
criteria for making scientific judgments based on the American Dietetic
This approach should
Association's criteria for health claims. 2 '
provide a basis for making disclaimers about claims that lack scientific
providing a needed
agreement. The disclaimer may also be valuable in
21
claims.1
health
the
on
research
more
for
incentive
Nutrient Detriments and Health Claims: The Case of Chocolate
A report of a short-term study published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association ("JAMA") found that dark chocolate can
reduce blood pressure.'2 2 Other studies indicate that chocolate may
reduce "bad cholesterol" or contain an antioxidant that may protect the
heart against damage to blood vessels.'23 Such reports raise the
specter-or hope for some-that dark chocolate is a health food.
However, while some might believe that health claims will take the fun
out of a tempting treat, others fear the claims might lead to poor food
choices.
Whether these claims for chocolate can be made for ordinary foods
under the court decisions involves in part determining whether the study
lacks "credible evidence" or would be precluded under a broader view of
the "weight of the evidence" test. Assuming a JAMA report passes the
test, disclaimers would also have to be developed that reflect the grade
of the support.
With respect to foods like chocolate, there is an additional hurdle
since, under the statute, claims are precluded for foods with nutrient
detriments such as butter that increase the risk of disease or of a dietB.

119. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 653 n.2.
120. Guidance on Ranking System, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that "FDA has
tentatively chosen to base its evidence-based ranking system on that of the Institute for
Clinical Systems Improvement ... as adapted by the American Dietetic Association with
modifications specific to FDA") (footnotes omitted).
121. See Deregulation, supra note 30, at 113-14 (discussing need for incentives, and
suggesting allowing labeling claims for "research in progress" when a promising program
is being supported individually or cooperatively by marketers).
122. Christina Heiss, M.D., et al., VascularEffects of Cocoa Rich in Flavor-3-ols,JAMA,
Aug. 27, 2003, at 1030.
123. Id.; Chocolate'sHealth Benefits Melted Away by DairyProduct, WALL ST. J., Aug.
28, 2003, at D15 [hereinafter WALL ST. J.] (describing studies on health benefits and that
milk counters the effect); Jane E. Allen, Chocolate That Not-so-guilty Pleasure;Some Forms
of it Can Be Good for the Heart,Recent FindingsSuggest, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at Fl.
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related health condition.124 The FDA can still grant an exception and
allow the claim, but only if the FDA determines that doing so will assist
consumers "in maintaining healthy dietary practices. " "'
The FDA needs to be vigilant in waiving the requirement. Presumably, the FDA would not make such an exception for a food like
chocolate with its rich fat and calorie content. 126 However, the FDA
actually waived the requirement in allowing the qualified claims for nuts
that have a low level of saturated fat. 21 In allowing a claim for
walnuts, the FDA provided that the claim state the nuts were beneficial
in preventing coronary heart disease in a diet "not resulting in increased
caloric content." 2

If the claim is allowed, notwithstanding the risk

of increased consumption, the claim should state the caloric content of
the nuts and advise on the means to limit calories such as that the nuts
should not be eaten as an extra snack.
Perhaps some might maintain that the First Amendment permits
qualified health claims for foods like chocolate, and if they have nutrient
detriments, it should simply be a matter for disclaimers. Perhaps the
disclaimer might read, "Don't consume too much of a good thing that is
also a bad thing." It would be hard to believe that the Constitution
protects health claims that could contribute to the bad eating habits of
the public, including children, perpetuating patterns that have made
obesity and diabetes public health problems. While it is doubtful that
claims with disclaimers for chocolate would be constitutionally mandated, the results for other foods cannot be as confidently projected.

124. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(A) (2000).
125. Id. § 343(r)(3)(A)(ii). The Department of the Treasury, which regulates alcoholic
beverages, maintains that health claims on the beverages would have to disclose
detriments, such as the risk of heavy drinking and the categories of individuals likely to
benefit, but these disclosures have been criticized as too restrictive to meet the constititutional protections for free speech. See Ben Lieberman, The Powerof Positive Drinking:Are
Alcoholic Beverage Health Claims Constitutionally Protected?, 58 FOOD DRUG L.J. 511
(2003).
126. The researcher who studied the antioxidant effect of chocolate commented that it
does not rank as a health food because of its fat and sugar content. WALL ST. J., supra
note 123.
127. FDA, Center for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, QualifiedHealth Claims:Letter
of Enforcement Discretion-Nuts and Coronary Heart Disaster (July 14, 2003), at
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/qhenutsz.html.
128. See Qualified Health Claimsfor Walnuts, supra note 62. The outside experts who
reviewed the walnut claim for the agency "expressed concern that data" from some of the
supporting studies "suggested that subjects might add rather than substitute walnuts in
the diet" which could increase body weight and coronary risk. Id. at 8.
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DISEASE PREVENTION/NUTRITION

A. Non-Applicability of Commercial Speech to Drug Treatment
Health Claims
While the FDA has lost several cases on commercial speech grounds,
its position that Congress had limited health claims to those for disease
prevention and had left disease treatment claims subject to the drug
requirements was recently upheld on statutory and constitutional
grounds.129 The FDA denied approval of a health claim for saw
palmetto and its use to improve urine flow, reduce nocturia, and reduce
130
urgency associated with mild benign prostatic hyperglasia ("BHP").
The court found the statute to be ambiguous and deferred to the FDA's
interpretation, which the court found was reasonable in light of the
legislative history.3 ' Additional support was provided by the FDA's
safety rationale that a more adequate level of support was needed for
treatment claims because a "diseased population is particularly
vulnerable" and could suffer ill-effects from delayed treatment. 132
In a brief discussion, the court rejected the argument that the
constitutional protections for commercial speech permitted drug
treatment claims for supplements accompanied by a non-misleading
disclaimer about the lack of testing.1 3 The court held that the claims
could be precluded without the need to consider whether disclaimers
could eliminate confusion."' The court relied on the first step of
Central Hudson,"3 which bars illegal claims, and here the law barred
disease treatment health claims without FDA approval of a new drug
application."' The court of appeals rejected the argument that the
analysis was "completely circular" because plaintiffs did not question
that the government could condition the approval of drugs on the need
to meet the drug approval requirements.1 37 Because the government
129. Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 951-52 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The drug
requirements are in 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000) and require approval of an application for
a new drug showing that the drug is safe and has been found effective in adequate and
well-controlled studies.
130. Second Whitaker, 353 F.3d at 948.
131. Id. at 950-52.
132. Id. at 951.
133. Id. at 952,
134. Id.
135. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
136. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p), 355(a), (c)-(d) (2004) (prohibiting sale of new drugs unless the
agency has approved a new drug application showing the drug is safe and effective).
137. Second Whitaker, 353 F.3d at 953.
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could require drugs to be tested, the government could use speech to
determine whether the claims for a product made it a drug for which
approval was required. 138 The government was not regulating speech;
the government was examining the speech to determine how the product
was regulated under the statutory scheme." 39
The argument is deft, but not completely satisfactory, in avoiding the
circularity argument by tying its analysis to the plaintiff's failure to
question the constitutionality of the drug testing requirements generally.
The result gives Congress an all-or-nothing alternative. Presumably,
following this logic, if Congress had never made any exception for health
claims on foods from the drug requirements, then those making the
health claims would have had to obtain approval of the claim under the
drug standards, and commercial speech protections would not allow the
claims to be made simply with a nonmisleading disclaimer. However,
once Congress allows manufacturers to make product claims that would
ordinarily be drug claims, the use of disclaimers can displace any new
types of testing requirements that Congress might have mandated. That
approach runs against the legislative need to draw lines and adapt the
law in flexible ways to new circumstances.14 °
Moreover, in seeking certiorari, plaintiff explained its acceptance of
the drug testing requirement by tying it to intellectual property
protections."' The requirement for expensive tests and approval is
appropriate for products like chemical pharmaceuticals that can be
patented, a measure that provides the means to finance the tests.
However, that requirement is not appropriate for natural generic
substances, like supplements, and for them the First Amendment allows
claims with disclaimers. 42 One difficulty with that position is that it
might permit manufacturers of foods or other products that are not
patentable to dispense with doing expensive tests, even for safety, if
there was a disclaimer about the absence of testing. Ineffectual products
that claim to prevent or treat diseases can also cause safety problems by
delaying needed treatment. Furthermore, limiting claims to products

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Constitutionalizing,supra note 6, at 869-77.
141. Second Whitaker, 353 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 2004 WL
1243160, at 22 (U.S. May 28, 2004) (No. 03-1610). The Supreme Court has since denied
the petition for certiorari. Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
310 (2004).
142. Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, petition for certiorari filed, 2004 WL
1243160, at 8 (the drug provisions "contemplate patentability"and "[m]onopoly returns
achievable for patentable drugs are unachievable for [dietary supplements], making
recoupment of the extraordinary costs of drug approval impossible..."). Id. at 5.
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with adequate testing itself provides an incentive to do the tests and for
joint testing programs, even for products that are off-patent or that are
commodities. 43 The question, in the end, tests the appropriateness of
Congress's determinations about the need for adequate support for
claims to avoid safety risks from delayed care.
B.

Limiting Health Claims to NutritionalSupplements

Yet to be resolved is another question about the type of supplements
that can make disease-prevention health claims. By law, health claims
are permitted only on supplements that are "vitamins, minerals, herbs,
Under the FDA's regulaor other similar nutritional substances."'
existence by such
human
"sustaining
tions, nutritive value refers to
processes as promoting growth, replacing essential loss of essential
nutrients, or providing energy. " 4' 5 The provisions encompass conventional foods and nutrients but exclude non-food supplements like St.
John's Wort that have not been consumed for their taste or nutrition. 4' The statutory provision was written before DSHEA, a statute
that allowed all types of supplements to make structure and function
claims, but not disease claims, including supplements containing nonnutrient dietary substances not derived from foods.'4 7
Because commercial speech protections are based in the Constitution,
statutory restrictions are not necessarily dispositive. Thus, an untested
issue is whether dietary supplements, like St. John's Wort, can make
disease prevention health claims accompanied by disclaimers without
having to comply with the drug testing requirements. The Congressional
compromise represented by DSHEA allowed marketers of supplements
to make claims regarding one-half of the drug definition, the part that
relates to an effect on the structure and function of the body."' The
question that remains is whether the Constitution will give the

143. See Herbal Remedies, supra note 27, at 714-15. Congress provided for three years
of exclusive use of new claims made for drugs based on new tests. This exclusive use is
available even after the end of the patent against generic manufacturers who did not do
their own testing to support the new use. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(D)(iv) (2000). The makers of
off-patent OTC drugs helped to provide additional studies needed to support the continued
use of the drug when the FDA undertook a systematic review of the adequacy of the safety
and efficacy of drugs on the market. See PETER BARTON HUrr & RICHARD A. MERRILL,
FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 588-99,604-08 (1991) (providing an overview
of the OTC Review).
144. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (2000).
145. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(2) (2004).
146. Id.
147. See Deregulation, supra note 30, at 95-96.
148. Id.
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marketers of non-nutritional dietary supplements the ability to make
disease prevention claims covered by the other half of the drug
definition when accompanied by disclaimers.14 9
The decision in the Second Whitaker recognized that commercial
speech did not protect products that made claims that, by their nature,
were drug claims within the drug definition.15 This approach turns
on the issue of determining when speech relates to the nature of a drug
claim. Health claims for any supplement would have traditionally fallen
within the drug definition until Congress exempted the nutritional
supplements from that requirement in favor of a new regulatory regime
for disease prevention health claims. 1 ' Congress, however, did not
exempt health claims for non-nutritional supplements from the drug
definition." 2 A nonexemption from the drug definition would logically
seem to leave the claim as one that by its nature is a drug claim, and
thus one for which drug testing can be mandated under the Second
Whitaker analysis of Central Hudson.
That position also makes sense for policy reasons. Congress allowed
a more lenient standard for health claims on foods and nutritional
supplements because food choices can play an important role in helping
consumers prevent diet-related diseases.15 3 That rationale is lacking
for nonfood supplements. Allowing disease prevention claims for the
nonfood supplements would erode the protections provided by the drug
approval process. Furthermore, in upholding the agency's statutory
interpretation, the court in the Second Whitaker was influenced by the
safety consequences of ineffectual products used for drug treatment.'
Limiting disease prevention health claims to supplements that are
nutritional indirectly provides a greater assurance that the products are
safe. The court in Pearson, which deregulated health claims for
supplements, also noted that the safety of the supplements was not at

149. The court in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center determined that a
Congressional bar on advertisements for drugs compounded by pharmacies violated the
constitutional protections for commercial speech, and disclaimers were a means to preclude
consumer confusion. 535 U.S. 357, 373-77 (2002). Thus, the constitutional protections
extend to drugs to treat disease in some settings. Id. at 367-68, 371-72.
150. Second Whitaker, 353 F.3d at 953.
151. See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650,653; HerbalRemedies, supra note 27, at 676;
21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (2000).
152. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(D); 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (2004) (providing that a dietary
supplement is not considered a drug solely because of health claims for nutritional
substances).
153. See supra Part II.A.
154. Second Whitaker, 353 F.3d at 951.
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issue in the case.155 The supplements at issue in the case were
vitamins with a classic type of nutritional value.' 56 The safety of nonnutrient dietary supplements is a different matter, as the recent ban on
Ephedra illustrates. 5 7 DSHEA exempted all supplements from the
food additive provisions that permit prior review of new uses that raise
Even with that exemption, nutritional supplements
safety issues.'
have a greater likelihood of being safe because of the history of their use
in foods. Unless health claims are limited to nutritional supplements,
supplement marketers will have a choice of selling a non-nutritional
supplement with a structure and function claim under DSHEA or
making a disease prevention claim under the FDA's guidance for
qualified health claims.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Even if health claims can be limited constitutionally to nutritional
supplements, and if disease treatment claims can be precluded, there
remain important drawbacks about the manner in which supplements
are regulated that need Congressional attention.
Inadequacy of Safety Assurance
The risks posed by Ephedra have increased concern about the safety
of supplements and prompted an interest in reform.159 Under DSHEA,
the FDA, rather than the maker of the product, ordinarily bears the

A.

155. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 656.
156. Id. at 651-52.
157. See FDA, FDA News: FDA Issues Regulation Prohibiting Sale of Dietary
Supplements ContainingEphedrine Alkaloids and Reiterates Its Advice That Consumers
Stop Using These Products (Feb. 6, 2004), at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2004/
NEW01021.html.
158. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(6) (2000). Unfortunately, court interpretations narrowed
the applicability of the safety standard for certain supplements even before the statutory
change. See, e.g., United States v. Two Plastic Drums, 984 F.2d 814 (7th Cir. 1993). The
court held that when a supplement with a single ingredient was put into a gel cap it was
not added to a food because the gelatin in the cap was inert and did not affect its food
characteristics. Id. at 817. This is clearly wrong. The gelatin cap made the contents
palatable, which allows users to swallow the supplement without tasting the bitterness of
the ingredient, thus circumventing the natural protection that the body provides when
consuming substances with an offensive taste. Compare United States v. Two Plastic
Drums, 984 F.2d 814, with United States v. Oakmont Inv. Co., 987 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir.
1993) (finding protections needed).
159. See Michael Specter, Miracle In A Bottle, NEW YORKER, Feb. 2, 2004, at 64, 75
(reporting on safety risks with some supplements and a Congressional bill that would treat
supplements "more like drugs" which has been "advertised as an assault on the First
Amendment").
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burden to show that a supplement presents an unreasonable or
significant risk. 6 ° For new supplements not marketed before the
enactment of DSHEA, the marketer has the burden to show that the
supplement does not pose an unreasonable risk of health, but that
category has rarely been invoked.'
While one approach would be to restore the earlier food additive
provisions, another approach that may get more support would be to
amend the law to require all sellers of dietary supplements to have
affirmative evidence to substantiate the safety of supplements.' 62 The
FDA would then conduct a systematic review of the adequacy of the
safety substantiation for supplements and remove the ones with
inadequate support from the market.6 3 The Institute of Medicine has
also made a report on the priorities for reviewing safety risks posed by
existing supplements.'6 4
Congress's ability to enact these safety
protections would be governed by the rational basis test applicable to
substantive due process challenges, and should not be affected by the
constitutional protections for commercial speech. 6 '
B.

Substantiationof Claims

Safety cannot be readily determined in the abstract, and the question
is often, "Safe for what?" After all, the dose makes the poison, and the
amount and length of use increases the risk from a substance.'6 6 The
claims determine when a product is used and the extent of use. Safety
determinations for supplements are made on a risk-benefit basis in light
of the health benefits claimed. The risk-benefit test creates a link
between the support for the claim and the decision about the adequacy

160. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (f)(1)(A) (2000).
161. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (f)(1)(B) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2000). The FDA took
enforcement action against supplements containing androstendione on the grounds that the
substance was a new dietary ingredient and because the FDA was unaware of any
information showing that it was lawfully marketed as a dietary ingredient before DSHEA.
See FDA Center for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, Sample Warning Letter on
Androstenedione (Mar. 11, 2004), at www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/andltr.html.
162. See Deregulation,supra note 30, at 117-28 (discussing the substantiation model).
163. Id.
164. See National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine of the National
Academics, ProposedFrameworkfor Evaluatingthe Safety of Dietary Supplements (2002),
available at http://www.iom.edu.
165. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002) (describing the
"rational basis" or "conceivable basis" test that governs due process review).
166. See United States v. Lexington Mill Co., 232 U.S. 399, 412 (1914) (quoting a
statement by Senator Heyburn: "[Elverything which contains poison is not poison. It
depends on the quantity and the combination.").
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of the safety substantiation.16 7 If the product is ineffective at the
labeled doses, this may lead users to increase the doses they take, which,
in turn, may increase the risk of adverse reactions.'6 8 Thus, any effort
to improve the safety determinations for supplements may lead attention
to the adequacy of the support for the claims made by supplements.
In the case of health claims made by nutritional supplements, the
adequacy of the support for the claim no longer turns on the statutory
standard of significant scientific agreement because, under Pearson,the
Constitution permits the claims to be made with disclaimers. 169 The
FDA reviews the qualified claim in advance, but the FDA has the
burden to show either that the claim lacks credible evidence, or that the
claim is against the weight of the evidence and that the disclaimer is
misleading. 7 °
In the case of structure and function claims governed by DSHEA, the
"
maker must substantiate the claim.17
' The requirement does not seem
to be enforced in practice, and the FDA faces considerable hurdles in
doing so. The vagueness of the claims and the long-term benefits
claimed may make it difficult to substantiate them.172 Does it matter
whether a supplement really works, for example, in maintaining lung
function or the cardiovascular function? If Congress undertakes reform
of DSHEA that question will be implicitly on the table.
If it matters that claims on products are true, Congress should make
the substantiation requirement meaningful and provide the FDA
adequate resources to implement it. The difficulty of doing so, though,
makes it appropriate to consider another alternative. Should supplement makers be able to make structure and function claims with the
disclaimers and the type of support identified in the FDA's guidance for
qualified health claims? A qualified statement that is enforceable might
be thought better than a requirement for a fully supported claim that is
not enforced in practice.
However, no legislative change should be made unless the qualified
structure and function claims have adequate support and adequate
disclaimers. The level of support for the claim, such as its D/weak
grade, should be prominently stated, and the disclaimer should provide

167.

See Deregulation, supra note 30, at 122, noting the FDA position and the

suggestion that the level of risks for OTC drugs may provide the basis for the risk-benefit
comparison.
168. Id. The ineffectiveness of Ephedra at the labeled doses may have invited misuse.
169. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 653.
170. See supra Parts II.B, II.C.
171. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(B) (2004).
172.

See Herbal Remedies, supra note 27, at 693-95.
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the additional information discussed above. 171 Moreover, the maker of
the claim should have the burden to provide the support for the qualified
claim and for showing that the disclaimer is not misleading. Under
Pearson the burden is now on the FDA to show the lack of support for
the claim and the inadequacies of disclaimers for qualified health
claims. 174 The need to obtain the FDA's review in advance provides
17
some incentive for the maker of the claim to try to provide support. 1
Supplements making structure and function claims under the DSHEA
are already on the market, and the maker of the product lacks that
incentive for cooperation. The burden should be on the supplement
maker to show either that the claim is fully substantiated, a showing
that may need significant scientific agreement for the claim, or that
there is adequate support for a qualified claim with fully adequate
disclaimers of the type described in Part 11.176
However, the approach of putting the burden of support on the maker77
of the claim could be challenged on commercial speech grounds.
Congress should not enact an approach of allowing qualified structure
and function claims without putting the burden for supporting the
claims and the disclaimers on the maker. If Congress enacts these
safeguards, Congress's judgment deserves respect. The regulatory policy
affects the entire population and can be the subject of strong debate and
wide public interest. Products intended to be ingested involve safety
consequences not typically present in other cases involving commercial
speech. 7 ' The expansion of the commercial speech protections for
foods, drugs, and supplements needs to be reconsidered. Thus, the
recognition, even if limited, of the need for more deference to Congress's

173. See supra Parts III.A.3, III.B.2.
174. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 660.
175. See Guidanceon Interim Procedures,supra note 1, at 2 (it can evaluate petitions
more efficiently and effectively if they are well-organized and contain all the relevant
information).
176. See Deregulation,supra note 30, at 107-09 (discussing the substantiation criteria).
To the extent that Congress wants supplements to be an indirect means to give consumers
the freedom of choice to use products for unproven drug purposes, allowing safe products
to state simply that the product is a dietary supplement provides a balance in protecting
consumers since it would make clear that consumers need to get their information from
sources on which they choose to rely, and not from the marketer of the product. See Herbal
Remedies, supra note 27, at 715-24.
177. See W. States, 535 U.S. at 357; Pearson, 164 F.3d at 650.
178. Some of the notable free speech cases have involved pricing, media companies, or
deception involving economic harm. See cases in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 6, at 401-546 (2d ed. 1988); Constitutionalizing,supra note 6, at 823-29.
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judgment about the regulation of these products is an important and
welcomed development.7 9

179. See Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2004). See also W. States, 535
U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cautioning against an
overly rigid "commercial speech" doctrine that will transform what ought to be a
legislative or regulatory decision about the best way to protect the health and
safety of the American public into a constitutional decision prohibiting the
legislature from enacting necessary protections. As history in respect to the Due
Process Clause shows, any such transformation would involve a tragic ...
misunderstanding.).

